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Indian Country and Inherent Tribal
Authority: Will They Survive ANCSA?
MARILYN J. WARD FORD*
This Article analyzes the effect of the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act (“ANCSA”) on the existence of Indian country and
inherent tribal authority in Alaska.  The Article first presents a
history of the status of Native Alaskan land rights and then dis-
cusses the importance of Indian country and tribal sovereignty to
Native Alaskans.  Next, the Article provides a summary of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dis-
trict v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II)
as well as an overview of legislative history and judicial precedent
traditionally applied to determine the existence of Indian country
and inherent tribal sovereignty.  Finally, the Article urges the
United States Supreme Court to uphold the decision in the Venetie
II case by demonstrating that ANCSA did not extinguish Indian
country or inherent tribal sovereignty for the Venetie tribe.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the delegates standing motionless and quiet the Presi-
dent said, “I want you to be among the first to know that I have
signed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.”
After the President finished his statement there was applause
and the delegates started congratulating each other.  Attendants
at the meeting were overjoyed, and most delegates viewed
ANCSA as a victory for their people.
Like many other delegates, I thought ANCSA would bring
land and money to our people, and that it would provide a
means to improve the living conditions of a people basically liv-
ing in poverty.
ANCSA did not provide wealth, land, or improvement in the
lifestyles of Alaska Natives.  It instead divided Alaska Natives,
placed their lands and culture in jeopardy, and only brought
worthwhile wealth and benefit to corporate consultants, lawyers,
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managers, employees, and directors.
ANCSA was an Act of deception.  An Act destined for fail-
ure.  An Act designed to assimilate Alaska Natives into the
mainstream of American society.1
When the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)2
was enacted in December 1971, many Alaska Natives and their
leaders celebrated.3  They believed ANCSA was an “innovative
and wide-ranging Act, designed to empower and enrich Alaska
Native Peoples,” preserve and protect their ancestral lands and
culture, and assure their self determination.4  They thought the Act
finally would provide the protection they sought for their Native
lands, subsistence way of life, heritage, and culture.5  Most Alaska
Natives viewed ANCSA as a “real victory.”6
But almost three decades after its enactment, many Alaska
Natives now believe that rather than a victory, ANCSA was
merely an “act of deception.”7  They argue that the Act destroyed
their title to ancestral lands; created a complex corporate scheme
in which corporations own, manage, and control their ancestral
land; divided their communities; jeopardized their culture; and ef-
fectively relegated them to second-class citizens.8
While Alaska Native concerns with ANCSA are numerous, a
recent Ninth Circuit decision has allayed some of these concerns.
In Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II),9 the Ninth Circuit held
that ANCSA did not extinguish Indian country in Alaska.  The
existence of Indian country has important implications for Alaska
Native tribes in that it would allow them to maintain significant in-
herent authority.
This article will discuss ANCSA and its recent interpretation
in Venetie II.  Part II describes the land rights of Alaska Natives
both before and after ANCSA.  Part III defines Indian country and
inherent tribal sovereignty, presents the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
Venetie II, and provides an overview of the legislative and judicial
history of Indian country and inherent tribal sovereignty.  Part IV
1. ROBERT RUDE, AN ACT OF DECEPTION 3 (1996) (the President being
quoted is Richard Nixon).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629(e) (1994)).
3. RUDE, supra note 1, at 3.
4. John E. Smelcer, Preface to RUDE, supra note 1.
5. Emil Notti, Foreword to RUDE, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
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argues that the United States Supreme Court should uphold the
Venetie II decision on the basis that ANCSA did not extinguish In-
dian country and inherent tribal sovereignty in Alaska, and that
the decision is narrowly tailored to apply only to the Venetie tribe.
II. ANCSA AND SETTLEMENT OF ABORIGINAL LAND CLAIMS
Congress adopted ANCSA in 1971 to resolve controversies
regarding the use, possession, and ownership of Alaska’s aborigi-
nal land and abundant resources.10  Prior to the adoption of
ANCSA, Alaska Natives possessed, used, occupied, and claimed
Alaskan territory as their ancestral land.11  This land played, and
continues to play, a crucial role in the traditional subsistence life-
style of Alaska Natives.  Alaska Natives have always lived on re-
sources taken from Alaska’s land and waters, which provide them
with “an abundance of fish, wildlife, and edible plants for subsis-
tence.”12
A. Status of Aboriginal Land Rights Prior to ANCSA
Prior to ANCSA, many issues regarding the rights of Alaska
Natives to their aboriginal lands were unclear or unresolved.  The
Treaty Concerning the Cession of Russian Possessions in North
America,13 which, in 1867, transferred power over Alaska from
10. The House of Representatives Report concerning the passage of ANCSA
states the following:
The extent to which the Natives in Alaska could prove their claims of
aboriginal title is not known.  Native leaders asserted that the Natives
have in the past used and occupied most of Alaska.  Use and occupancy
patterns have changed over the years, however, and lands used and oc-
cupied in the past may not be used and occupied now.  Moreover, with
development of the State, many Natives no longer get their subsistence
from the land.
The pending bill does not purport to determine the number of acres
to which the Natives might be able to prove an aboriginal title.  If the
tests developed in the courts with respect to Indian tribes were applied
in Alaska, the probability is that the acreage would be large — but how
large no one knows.  A settlement on this basis, by means of litigation if
a judicial forum were to be provided, would take many years, would in-
volve great administrative expense, and would involve a Federal liability
of an undeterminable amount.
It is the consensus of the Executive Branch, the Natives, and the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House that a legislative
rather than a judicial settlement is the only practical course to follow.
The enactment of H.R. 10367 would provide this legislative settlement.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-523, at 3, (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2194.
11. See id.
12. RUDE, supra note 1, at 19.
13. Mar. 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ., 15 Stat. 539.  The treaty indirectly dealt with
Alaska Natives’ legal rights by providing that “[t]he uncivilized tribes will be
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Russian to American control, acknowledged aboriginal land rights
of Alaska Natives but failed to define them.14  The legal rights of
Alaska Natives again were left undefined in the Organic Act of
1884,15 which established a civil government for the Alaskan terri-
tory.  In fact, section 8 of the Organic Act specifically postponed
resolution of the issue and reserved it for future action by Con-
gress.16  The Alaska Native Allotment Act of 190617 provided for
the allotment of homesteads of up to 160 acres of non-mineral
land.  However, it also failed to resolve the issue of Alaska Native
land claims.18
The Alaska Statehood Act of 195819 acknowledged that
Alaska Natives had claims to the land, but again did not resolve
the issue of their rights.  The Statehood Act directed the govern-
ment of Alaska to select 102,500,000 acres of federal lands that
were “vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved at the time of their
selection.”20  However, the Statehood Act disclaimed any right or
title to “any lands or other property . . . the right or title to which
may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts . . . or is held by
the United States in trust for said natives.”21  Despite the fact that
the Act acknowledged Alaska Natives’ rights to lands used and oc-
                                                                                                                                
subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time,
adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.”  Id. at 542.
14. See id.
15. ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
16. Section 8 of the Organic Act of 1884 provides
[t]hat the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed
in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now
claimed by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire ti-
tle to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress . . . .
Id. at 26.  The statute was apparently intended to “provide some security to non-
Indians who had pioneered in Alaska,” but its “effect on aboriginal title, how-
ever, has never been certain.” FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 741 (Rennard Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson eds., Michie 1982).  In
United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442, 448 (3d Div. 1905), a federal court in
Alaska interpreted the Act as providing protection for Alaska Natives’ right of
occupancy.  But in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278 (1955),
the United States Supreme Court ruled that rather than recognizing their right of
ownership, the Act simply maintained the status quo.
17. ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197.
18. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 (D.
Alaska 1977), aff’d, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing the Allotment Act’s
substance).
19. Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339, amended by 73 Stat. 141 (1959) (codified
as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 21-488 (1994)).  The Act disclaimed the right or title
to land that was held by Eskimos, Indians, or Aleuts and to all land that was held
in trust for them.  See id. § 4, 72 Stat. 341.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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cupied by them, it provided no definition or criteria for such use or
occupancy.22
Alaska Natives protested the early selections made by the
State of Alaska under the Statehood Act.23  They felt threatened
with the loss of their ancestral lands when the state began to select
lands near their villages.24  In fact, the “potential loss of lands near
Native [c]ommunities was the issue that brought Natives together,
and it was what led to the formation of Native organizations
throughout the state.”25  Thus newly organized, Alaska Natives
“publicly advocated a settlement that would protect aboriginal
rights, preserve Alaska Native culture, and bring self determina-
tion to Alaska Natives.”26
As part of their protest, Alaska Natives claimed aboriginal ti-
tle to almost all 365,000,000 acres of the state.27  In order to claim
title to this land, Alaska Natives filed claims with the Department
of the Interior.28  In 1967, the Secretary of the Interior imposed a
moratorium, or “land freeze,” on the transfer of title to public land
to the State of Alaska until the issue of native land claims was re-
solved. 29
22. See id.
23. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 742; see also Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp.
at 1017 (“In 1969 the state conducted sales of oil and gas leases for tentatively ap-
proved Arctic Slope lands.  The lease sale was vigorously protested by Alaska Na-
tives.”).
24. See RUDE, supra note 1, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 198 (citing Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard
West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 132 (1976)); see also ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE
CLAIMS 119 (1976).
By May of 1967, [39] protests had been filed.  They ranged in size from a
640-acre claim by the village of Chilkoot to the 58 million-acre claim of
the Arctic Slope Native Association.  Because many claims were over-
lapping, the total acreage under protest — about 380 million acres —
was greater than the land area of the state.
Id.
28. See Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. at 1017.
29. Pursuant to Public Land Order No. 4582, the freeze was scheduled to ex-
pire on midnight December 31, 1970.  See 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (1969).  The effect of
the moratorium was to freeze the appropriation and disposition of all public lands
in Alaska that were unreserved prior to the expiration of the order, including se-
lection by the state under the Statehood Act.  See United States v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that ANCSA extinguished
aboriginal titles of all Alaska Natives as well as all claims “based on” aboriginal
titles); see also Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. at 1017; ARNOLD, supra note 27, at
118; COHEN, supra note 16, at 742.
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B. Status of Native American Land Rights After ANCSA
The desire to end the Department of the Interior-imposed
land freeze, the 1969 discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay, and the pos-
sibility of earning substantial profits from the construction of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline were all significant factors in influencing
Congress to adopt ANCSA in 1971.30  Oil companies were ex-
tremely anxious to commence oil drilling operations in order to ex-
tract the “black gold” found in Alaska, but they declined to do so
until Native claims to the land had been extinguished.31  Increased
pressure from the oil companies to resolve the outstanding land
claims and to expedite the commencement of oil drilling opera-
tions clearly contributed to ANCSA’s adoption.32
In theory, Congress adopted the legislation to effectuate a
“fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups
of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims”33 and to resolve the is-
sues regarding the legal rights of 80,000 Alaska Natives to the land
they used and occupied and to which they claimed title.34  Pursuant
to ANCSA, the title to approximately forty-four million acres of
                                                                                                                                
“In the face of Federal guarantee that the Alaska Natives shall not be
disturbed in the use and occupation of lands, I could not in good con-
science allow title to pass into others’ hands . . . . Moreover, to permit
others to acquire title to the lands the Natives are using and occupying
would create an adversary against whom the Natives would not have the
means of protecting themselves.”
ARNOLD, supra note 27, at 118 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall).
30. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 742.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994).  The section provides that
there is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by
Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims;
the settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in con-
formity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without liti-
gation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting
their rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially
defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating a
reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without add-
ing to the categories of property and institutions enjoying special tax
privileges or to the legislation establishing special relationships between
the United States [g]overnment and the State of Alaska . . . .
Id. § 1601(a), (b).
34. See id. § 1601.  The House Report states, in relevant part, that
[i]t has been the consistent policy of the United States Government in its
dealings with Indian tribes to grant them title to a portion of the lands
which they occupied, to extinguish the aboriginal title to the remainder
of the lands by placing such lands in the public domain, and to pay the
fair value of the titles extinguished.  This procedure was initiated by
treaties in the earlier part of our history, and was completed by enact-
ment of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-523 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192-94.
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federal public land was conveyed indirectly to Alaska Natives
through their ownership of corporations established by the Act.35
They were awarded $962.5 million,36 and all Alaska Native land
claims were extinguished.37
Rather than simply conveying ancestral lands directly to
Alaska Natives, Congress established thirteen regional corpora-
tions38 and charged them with distributing the land and assisting
Native village corporations with receiving and administering the
lands for the benefit of Alaska Natives who would become stock-
holders in the Native village corporations.39  The Alaska Natives
35. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613.  ANCSA created a complex corporate
mechanism for Native selection, administration, and development of land in
Alaska.  It provided for the creation of thirteen regional corporations, the estab-
lishment of Native corporations, and the selection of title to 40 million acres of
land by Native villages and the regional corporations.  See id. §§ 1606, 1607, 1611,
1613.  Although ANCSA provided for 40 million acres of land to be conveyed to
Alaskan Natives, a total of 44 million acres was actually conveyed.
36. See id. § 1605.
37. See id. § 1603; see also United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F.
Supp. 1009, 1023 (D. Alaska 1977) (holding that ANCSA retroactively extin-
guished Alaska Natives’ aboriginal title, since “[c]ongressional intent was to make
clear that any prior grant of land under federal law or tentative approval under
. . . the Statehood Act operated to extinguish aboriginal title at the time the con-
veyance was made or the approval given.  In short, Congress intended the convey-
ance or approval to be the operative fact extinguishing aboriginal title.”).
38. ANCSA states that “[i]f the village had on the 1970 census enumeration
date a Native population between 25 and 99, [i]t shall be entitled to a patent to an
area of public lands equal to 69,120 acres.”  43 U.S.C. § 1613(a).  The corpora-
tions were directed to select land for their use in twelve geographic regions and
within the vicinity of the Native villages, and they were then responsible for ad-
ministering their portion of the Alaska Native Fund and distributing the funds to
the Native shareholders.  See id. §§ 1606, 1611.
39. See id. § 1611.  Pursuant to ANCSA, shares of stock in the ANCSA corpo-
rations originally were non-alienable and could not be transferred to non-Natives
until after December 18, 1991.  See id. § 1606.  Under a 1980 amendment, the re-
strictions on transfer of the stock to non-Natives was to be lifted on December 18,
1991, the date when all stock originally issued to Natives in Regional and Village
corporations was canceled and new shares were issued.  See Alaska National In-
terest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 2491, § 1401(a)
(1980).  A 1991 amendment pushed the operative date back to July 16, 1993 un-
less a corporation’s board of directors approved a resolution by March 1, 1992
declining the prohibition on alienability.  See Little Bighorn Battlefield National
Monument, Pub. L. No. 102-201, 105 Stat. 1631, 1633, § 301 (1991) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1629c(a) (1994)).  In those cases where the articles were not amended,
Native corporation stock, as well as actual control of the corporations themselves,
could be taken away from the Native Alaskans and conveyed to non-Natives who
would not only own the land but also establish policy for the corporations.  See
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were entitled to enroll and to become stockholders in a regional
corporation, as well as in one of more than 200 Native village cor-
porations; enrollment was determined according to place of resi-
dence or origin.40
A major criticism of ANCSA is that Congress created an
overly complex corporate scheme — requiring Alaska Natives to
become stockholders and the Native corporations to manage land
and money awarded under ANCSA — despite the fact that when
deliberating the Act, Congress knew that many Alaska Natives
were inexperienced in business matters generally and were com-
pletely unfamiliar with corporations and their operations.41  In fact,
Congress had access to many studies that described Alaska Natives
as “a people who lived in poverty, were seasonally employed, and
survived primarily on subsistence activities.”42  The studies also
provided evidence that most “[a]dult Natives [were] likely to have
less than an eighth grade education.”43  Despite evidence of their
lack of formal education and business experience, one commenta-
tor noted, “‘By legislative stroke, the Congress converted all
Alaska Natives into members of the corporate world, and receivers
of annual reports, proxy statements, solicitations and balance
sheets.’” 44
III. THE EFFECT OF ANCSA ON INDIAN COUNTRY AND
INHERENT TRIBAL AUTHORITY IN ALASKA
It is undebatable that ANCSA explicitly extinguished aborigi-
nal title.  Additionally, ANCSA revoked reserves set aside by leg-
islative or executive action for the benefit of Native villages and
authorized the transfer of money and land to be managed by Na-
                                                                                                                                
COHEN, supra note 16, at 757.
40. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 740.
41. See RUDE, supra note 1, at 4-5.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Monroe E. Price, A Moment in History: The Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 8 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 89, 95 (1979)).  Another
commentator wrote,
Although corporations were unfamiliar to most Alaska Natives, they
were expected to organize new corporations, meet deadlines in ANCSA,
study legal issues and select lands, enroll shareholders, invest and dis-
tribute ANCSA monies, and do a variety of other tasks.  Native direc-
tors had to learn their duties as “on the job trainees.”
[T]he large number of tasks facing Native directors and the lack of
business experience resulted in the acquisition of many disappointing in-
vestments.  The Native corporations were open game for con-artists and
shysters.  Unfavorable investments made by Native corporations re-
sulted in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars, and placed some of
the Native corporations into positions of bankruptcy by the early 1980’s.
RUDE, supra note 1, at 5.
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tive village and regional corporations.45  It is debatable, however,
whether ANCSA implicitly extinguished Indian country46 and in-
herent tribal sovereignty.47
The designation of an area as Indian country is extremely im-
portant to Native Americans.  It recognizes their right to control
their own lives and affairs within that area.  In Indian country, Na-
tives enjoy inherent sovereignty, i.e., the right of self-government
and self-determination.48  Specifically, in Indian country, a tribal
government has the following powers: to enact and impose taxes;
to adopt and enforce its own internal tribal laws; to adjudicate civil
and criminal disputes and minor criminal offenses that occur on
tribal lands; to issue marriage licenses; to buy and sell real prop-
erty; to regulate land use; to provide essential and non-essential
governmental services; and to regulate affairs of non-Natives on
tribal land.49  Also in Indian country, Native Alaskan tribal gov-
ernments enjoy the same sovereign immunity possessed by federal
and state governments.50  They can be sued only if they consent or
if they engage in acts beyond the scope of their authority.51
The question of whether ANCSA extinguished Indian country
45. See 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).  It defines Indian country as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
47. Native American tribal nations are distinct sovereign political communi-
ties that retain the right of self-government.  The concept of inherent tribal sover-
eignty was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  In Worcester, Justice Marshall wrote, “The
Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to
be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties
with the Indian nations, and [c]onsequently, admits their rank among those pow-
ers who are capable of making treaties.”  Id. at 559; see also COHEN, supra note
16, at 244-46.
48. Although tribes exercise broad powers in Indian country, they do not
have absolute power.  For instance, tribes cannot enforce their criminal laws
against non-Natives in Indian country.  See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
49. STEPHEN C. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 16 (1992);
COHEN, supra note 16, at 246-57.
50. See PEVAR, supra note 49, at 309 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citi-
zen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 508 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
51. See id.
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and inherent tribal authority in Alaska is currently being decided
by the federal courts.  Specifically, the United States Supreme
Court will soon determine whether the Venetie tribe in Alaska
continues to live on Indian country and retain its inherent tribal
sovereignty in light of ANCSA.  In reaching its decision, the Court
will look to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Alaska ex rel. Yukon
Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government
(Venetie II),52 as well as to legislative history and judicial precedent
concerning the existence of Indian country and inherent tribal sov-
ereignty.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in the Venetie Litigation
In order to understand the Venetie litigation, it is important to
examine the events leading up to it.  Almost all of the inhabitants
of the Native Village of Venetie are descendants of the Neets’aii
Gwich’in, the tribe of Alaska Natives who have historically inhab-
ited the area.53  The Neets’aii Gwich’in, in 1940, adopted a consti-
tution in compliance with the Indian Reorganization Act.54  That
constitution established the Native Village of Venetie as the gov-
erning authority of the tribe.55  Subsequently, in 1943, the Secretary
of the Interior formed a reservation for the tribe from 1.8 million
acres of land that surrounded the Village of Venetie.56  Since the
date of its establishment, the Native Village of Venetie continu-
ously governed the reservation.57 In 1976, the Native Village of
Venetie restructured its council to include representation from an
additional Neets’aii Gwich’in community and changed its name to
the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.58
ANCSA revoked reserves apportioned to Alaska Natives
through legislative or executive action, including the Venetie Res-
52. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
53. See id. at 1289.
54. See 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994).  The statute provides that
[a]ny Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its common wel-
fare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, and any
amendments thereto, which shall become effective when
(1) ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe or
tribes at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary under
such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe; and
(2) approved by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d) of this sec-
tion.
Id.
55. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1289.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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ervation.59  However, ANCSA explicitly did not “relieve, replace,
or diminish any obligation of the United States or of the State of
Alaska to protect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives.”60
In 1973, shareholders of both the Venetie Indian and Neets’aii
corporations exercised their right under section 1618 of ANCSA to
take fee simple title, as tenants in common, to the former Venetie
Reservation.61  In 1979, Venetie’s ANCSA lands that had formerly
been owned by the two ANCSA village corporations, were con-
veyed to the Venetie tribal government, and the shareholders
voted to dissolve the two Native village corporations.62
In 1986, Venetie implemented a Business Activities Tax of
five percent on gains derived from commercial activities within the
village.63  That same year, the State, through the Yukon Flats
School District, contracted with the Neeser Construction Company
to construct a new school inside the boundaries of the Native Vil-
lage of Venetie.64  Venetie imposed the Business Activities Tax and
assessed a sum of $161,203.15 against the construction company.65
Although the tax was assessed against the contractor, the State was
responsible for its payment.66  Upon the State’s refusal to pay, the
Village brought an action for collection in tribal court.67
The State of Alaska refused to defend the action in tribal
court and filed a claim in federal court seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief.68  In its action, the State argued that Venetie lacked
jurisdiction to impose the tax.69  The district court issued an order
preliminarily enjoining the tribe’s enforcement proceedings, which
Venetie appealed.70
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie (Venetie I), the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling and af-
59. See 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, and except where inconsistent with the provisions of this [Act], the various
reserves set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order for Native
use or for administration of Native Affairs . . . are hereby revoked subject to any
valid existing rights of non-Natives.”).
60. See id. § 1601(c).
61. See Venetie II, 101 F. 3d at 1290.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie (Venetie I), 856 F.2d 1384, 1386
(9th Cir. 1988).
69. See id.
70. See id.
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firmed the preliminary injunction.71  The Venetie I court deter-
mined that whether or not the tribe was authorized to impose its
Business Activities Tax upon non-members depended upon
whether it was a federally recognized tribe and, if so, whether it in-
habited Indian country.72  The case was then remanded back to the
district court on these issues.73
On remand, the district court found that although Venetie
may have constituted Indian country before the adoption of
ANCSA, the statute implicitly extinguished the Indian country
status of all Alaska Native villages, including Venetie.74  It held
that although Venetie was a federally recognized tribe, it did not
occupy Indian country since ANCSA extinguished Indian country
in Alaska.75  The tribe, therefore, was not authorized to impose the
tax.76
The tribe appealed the district court’s holding that Venetie
did not occupy Indian country as defined in the statute.77  It argued
the holding was erroneous for two reasons: (1) the court focused
on the set-aside and federal superintendence criteria of the Indian
country test and therefore applied an unduly narrow and restric-
tive test in determining whether the Venetie tribe’s land was In-
dian country,78 and (2) the court failed to apply the fundamental
rule of liberal construction and interpretation in favor of Indians
when deciding whether ANCSA extinguished Indian country in
Alaska.79  On appeal, the Venetie tribe reasserted its position that
it continues to occupy Indian country and retains its inherent
authority to tax activities that occur within its territory.80
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Venetie and stated that the dis-
71. See id. at 1391.
72. See id. at 1390.
73. See id. at 1391.
74. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t, No. F87-0051, 1995 WL 462232, at *16 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
75. See id. at *14-*15.  The district court reasoned that Indian country exists
only “where the degree of congressional and executive control over the tribe is so
pervasive as to evidence an intention that the federal government, not the state,
be the dominant political institution in the area.”  Id. at *14.  Furthermore, since
ANCSA “effected a significant change” in the relationship between the federal
government and Alaska Natives, the court found that the federal government no
longer exercised that level of superintendence.  Id. at *15.
76. See id at *20.  Although the decision deals with multiple issues, the discus-
sion in this article is limited to the court’s determination of what qualifies land as
Indian country.
77. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1289.
78. See id. at 1291-94.
79. See id. at 1294-95.
80. See id at 1290.
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trict court erred in applying an Indian country test that was too re-
strictive.81  It also rejected the district court’s holding that the fed-
eral government, rather than the state, must be the dominant po-
litical institution in the area and that ANCSA extinguished Indian
country absent “clear and plain” language to the contrary.82  Fi-
nally, the court rejected the district court’s ruling that lands owned
by either a Native corporation or a tribe in fee simple could not
constitute Indian country.83
The court of appeals began its analysis with a look at 18
U.S.C. § 1151, which defines Indian country to be either a reserva-
tion, an allotment, or a dependent Indian community.84  After con-
cluding that the land occupied by Venetie was neither a reserva-
tion nor an allotment, the Ninth Circuit held that in order to be
Indian country, Venetie had to be a dependent Indian community.
The court then had to establish an appropriate test for determining
whether the tribe was, in fact, a dependent Indian community.85
The court stated that although the United States Supreme Court
had never established a test for determining whether a “tribe con-
stitutes a dependent Indian community within the meaning of sec-
tion 1151(b)[,] . . . [a] clear body of Court precedent emphasizes
two central features of the inquiry into whether a given area con-
stitutes Indian country, as a general matter”: (1) the community or
land must be “‘validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such’”
(“federal set-aside”) and (2) the Natives who inhabit the land must
be “‘under the superintendence of the [federal] Government’”
(“federal superintendence”).86
Although the Court of Appeals adopted these two require-
ments — set-aside and federal superintendence — it held that they
should be “broadly construed.”87  It rejected the district court’s
narrow test and found that the set-aside and federal superin-
tendence criteria must be satisfied above all others because they
81. See id. at 1292-94 (rejecting the district court’s departure from the circuit
court’s suggested six-part test).
82. Id. at 1293.
83. See id. at 1296.
84. See id. at 1291.  The statute delineates three types of areas that can qualify
as Indian country: reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allot-
ments whose Indian titles have not been extinguished.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b)
(1994).
85. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1290-91.
86. Id. at 1291 (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)) (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634,
649 (1978); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938); United States v.
Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)).
87. Id. at 1293.
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are the dominant factors of the dependent Indian community test.88
1. Federal set-aside.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s analysis of the federal set-aside component of the
Indian country test.89  It did not believe that the “corporate model
of Native land ownership established under ANCSA precluded a
finding that the federal government had set aside the [Venetie
tribe’s] land . . . for the use of Alaska Natives.”90  It also disagreed
that ANCSA evidenced the intent of Congress to “treat Alaska
Natives as ordinary business entities — not Natives.”91  The court
reviewed ANCSA and found that (1) ANCSA corporations, with
their high degree of Native involvement and character, are vastly
different than other corporations; (2) the statute “suggests that the
local corporations are the instruments of, and owe obligations to,
the Native villages;” (3) ANCSA corporations differ from other
corporations in that the statute provides “significant protections”
of Alaska Native land; and (4) ANCSA corporations differ from
other corporations in the number of restrictions placed on Native
corporation stock.92  Based on this analysis, the court of appeals
held “land set aside for [ANCSA] corporations qualifies as land set
aside for Alaska Natives, as such.”93
2. Federal superintendence.  The court of appeals also
addressed the federal superintendence aspect of the Indian country
test.  It found that the superintendence requirement was “designed
to determine the extent to which the traditional trust relationship
between the federal government and Native Americans remains
intact in a particular case.”94  Additionally, it stressed that “[t]here
is no hard and fast rule for determining how involved the trust
relationship must be to constitute the requisite level of
superintendence.”95  The court noted that prior to the enactment of
ANCSA, “Alaska Natives were thought to be under the
guardianship of the United States and were entitled to the benefits
of this special relationship.”96
The court observed that the “‘dominant’ standard appears to
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1295.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1295-96.
93. Id. at 1295.
94. Id. at 1296.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. 78, 88 (1918); Pence v. Kleppe,
529 F.2d 135, 138 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); COHEN, supra note 16, at 739).
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have been determinative in the district court.”97  The lower court
had reasoned that state control over Native corporations was fur-
ther evidence that “federal superintendence had been displaced by
ANCSA.”98  The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that “the
introduction of state supervision over certain aspects of Indian life
does not eviscerate Indian country.”99  It noted that, “‘[a]t times
Congress has retained Indian country status but has delegated par-
tial jurisdiction to states over areas of Indian country or over spe-
cific legal subjects.’”100
According to the court of appeals, the appropriate test to de-
termine the existence of federal superintendence is “whether the
federal government has abandoned its trust responsibilities, rather
than whether the state government has been injected into tribal af-
fairs.”101  To support this proposition, the court extensively re-
viewed ANCSA and its legislative history and provided examples
supporting an argument of continued federal superintendence.102  It
also examined the plain language of the Act and emphasized that
ANCSA did not “extinguish federal superintendence of Alaska
Natives” because it contained no language that “clearly and ex-
plicitly” states or indicates an intent to do so.103  In the absence of
97. Id. at 1297.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 16, at 361).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1297-98.  The court stated:
Congress declared that ANCSA did not “relieve, replace, or diminish
any obligation of the United States or of the State or [sic] Alaska to pro-
tect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives . . . .”  Additionally,
Congress rejected an earlier version of the bill that would have trans-
ferred federal responsibilities for Alaska Natives to state authorities . . . .
ANCSA neither prohibits nor discontinues the provision of federal
services to Alaska Natives.  Payments made under the Act do not
“substitute for any governmental programs otherwise available to the
Native people of Alaska . . . .”  Indeed, Alaska Natives remain eligible
for federal benefit programs after ANCSA.
Id. at 1297 (citations omitted).
ANCSA did not end federal benefits and “protections for Alaska Na-
tives; it concerned only their lands and land-related claims.  Natives in
Alaska continue to be eligible for and receive assistance under federal
programs available to Indians throughout the United States.  All major
Indian legislation since ANCSA specifically has included Alaska Natives
or their villages or corporations.”
Id. at 1298 (quoting COHEN, supra note 16, at 766).
103. Id. at 1297.  The court stressed that since the adoption of ANCSA, Alaska
Natives continue to be eligible for and to receive assistance under federal pro-
grams available to Indians throughout the lower 48 states and that this relation-
ship sufficiently fulfills the federal superintendence requirement of the test.  See
id. at 1298.
FORD.CON 12/09/97  9:53 AM
458 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2
such language, the court held that ANCSA did not terminate the
“federal trust relationship with a Native tribe or organization,”
and, therefore, “the federal government continues to execute its
trust responsibilities toward Alaska Natives.”104
After concluding that the transfer of title to Native corpora-
tions rather than to tribes did not extinguish federal superin-
tendence over Alaska Natives, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that ANCSA implemented a policy of “self-determination that is
fundamentally at odds with the paternalistic echoes of the trust
relationship.”105  In order to reconcile these two findings, the court
relied on the federal policy of self-determination without termina-
tion of the trust relationship.106  The court observed that
President Nixon enunciated a federal policy toward Indians that
continues to this day: self-determination without termination of
the trust relationship.  The President “called for rejection of the
extremes of termination and paternalism: termination because it
ignored the moral and legal obligations involved in the special
relationship between tribes and the federal government, and pa-
ternalism because it resulted in ‘the erosion of Indian initiative
and morale.’”107
The court also reasoned that the federal government fulfills,
not abandons, its trust responsibilities by enacting legislation to fa-
cilitate self-determination by Native Americans.108  The Indian
Self-Determination Act109 was cited as support for the proposition
that “Indian self-determination involves increased participation of
Native Americans in the administration of federal programs, not
the elimination of those programs nor the removal of federal offi-
cials from a supervisory role over those programs.”110
After finding that “self-determination and ongoing federal su-
perintendence may co-exist,” the court stated that “this is precisely
104. Id. at 1297
105. Id. at 1299.
106. See id.
107. Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 16, at 186).  The court also stated that
[t]he reconciliation of self-determination and superintendence is re-
flected in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
of 1975, where Congress declared its commitment “to the maintenance
of the [f]ederal [g]overnment’s unique and continuing relationship with,
and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as
a whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-
determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the
[f]ederal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to effec-
tive and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning,
conduct, and administration of those programs and services.”
Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (1994)).
108. See id.
109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458.
110. Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1299.
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the federal-tribal relationship that was introduced by ANCSA.”111
It then stated that “ANCSA neither eliminated a federal set aside
for Alaska Natives, as such, nor terminated federal superin-
tendence over Alaska Natives.”112  The court therefore held that
“Indian country still may exist in Alaska.”113
3. An examination of whether Venetie specifically occupies
Indian country.  After holding that, despite ANCSA, Indian
country may still exist in Alaska as a general matter, the court of
appeals then had to determine whether Venetie, specifically,
occupied Indian country.114  Drawing from similar tests created by
other circuit courts in United States v. South Dakota115 and in
United States v. Martine,116 the court adopted a six-part test to
determine whether a particular community constitutes Indian
country.117
According to the court, whether a particular geographical area
is a dependent Indian community depends on consideration of the
following factors:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabi-
tants to Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the estab-
lished practice of government agencies toward that area; (4) the
degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the
degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent
to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and pro-
tection of dependent Indian peoples.118
First, the court considered the nature of the area owned by
Venetie.  It found that the former Venetie Reservation was a well
defined area consisting of “isolated and undeveloped” land that
had traditionally been used by the Neets’aii Gwich’in “to the vir-
tual exclusion of other people” and was still today occupied almost
exclusively by the tribe.119  The court agreed with the district
court’s determination that the land was “well suited to the [t]ribe’s
subsistence life-style” and concluded that “Venetie has a special
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1299-1300.
113. Id. at 1300.
114. See id.
115. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
116. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
117. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1300.
118. Id. at 1294.  The court applied the six-part test originally adopted in Vene-
tie I.  See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie (Venetie I), 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.
1988) (citing United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1971)).
119. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1300.
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‘use and occupancy’ relationship to the land at issue.”120
Looking to the second prong of the test, the court next exam-
ined the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and
the federal government.  It found that “Venetie is home to the
Neets’aii Gwich’in,” that the inhabitants of Venetie are almost ex-
clusively members of the Venetie tribe, and concluded that this
“near-perfect correlation between area inhabitants and tribal
membership indicates the strong ties between the land, its people,
and the tribe.”121  The court also found that the Venetie tribe had a
“long history of interaction” with the federal government.122  To
support this finding, it cited Venetie’s “significant contacts and re-
lationships” with federal agencies that helped administer educa-
tional and health services in the village.123
In discussing the third prong of the dependent Indian commu-
nity test, the established practice of government agencies toward
the area, the court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the
federal government had to be the “dominant political institution”
in the area.124  The court stated that dominance was the wrong
“benchmark,” the correct inquiry is whether the federal govern-
ment had “abandoned its trust responsibilities.”125  The court found
a continuing relationship between the federal government and the
Venetie tribe.126  As examples of the federal government’s exercise
of trust responsibilities, the court noted that Venetie had received
federal grants for an airport, a housing project, water and wastewa-
ter systems, and housing renovation.127
Venetie satisfied the fourth prong of the test, which examines
the degree of federal ownership and control over the area, even
though ANCSA terminated federal ownership of the reservation
and the land is owned by the Village of Venetie in fee simple.128  In
fact, the court specifically stated that “tribal ownership of land in
fee does not defeat a finding of Indian country.”129  Based on its
earlier analysis of the nature of the relationship between the fed-
eral government and the Venetie community and federal superin-
tendence over the affairs of the tribe, the court concluded that the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1301.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. (comparing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913) and In-
dian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Electric Co., 89 F.3d 908, 918 (1996)).
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Venetie tribe had met its burden of producing sufficient
“alternative evidence of federal superintendence over Native af-
fairs in the territory.”130
The fifth prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test examined the de-
gree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants.  Accepting the district
court’s findings that all but a few residents of Venetie were Alaska
Natives and members of the Venetie tribe who had voluntarily
come together to form their tribal government, which provided for
the “‘protection and welfare of the whole community,’” the court
of appeals determined that the “high degree of cohesiveness
among the inhabitants of Venetie is uncontested.”131
With respect to the sixth prong of the test, the extent to which
Venetie’s land was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection
of dependent Alaska Natives, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court’s finding that when the Neets’aii Gwich’in formed a
reservation in 1943, “‘land was set aside for [them] as a Native
people.’”132  However, the court of appeals disagreed with the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that ANCSA extinguished the Venetie
Reservation and transferred the land to a village corporation
rather than to the Neets’aii Gwich’in tribe, and that, as a result, the
land “is no longer set aside for the use and occupancy of Alaska
Natives, as such.”133  The court concluded that the “village corpora-
tions established under ANCSA, while business entities, maintain
a distinctly Native identity” and that “land set aside for such cor-
porations qualifies as land set aside for the use, occupancy, and
protection of Alaska Natives, as such.”134
Thus, the court found that Venetie satisfied all six elements
and was therefore a dependent Indian community.135  Since the
court had already determined that Venetie met the requirements
of federal set-aside and superintendence, it held that Venetie was
Indian country.136
B. Legislative and Judicial Determination of Indian Country
The term Indian country “was first used by Congress in 1790
to describe the territory controlled by Indians.”137  In 1948, Con-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Ve-
netie Tribal Gov’t., No. F87-0051, 1995 WL 462232, at *19 (D. Alaska Aug. 2,
1995).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1302.
135. Id. at 1301-02.
136. See id.
137. PEVAR, supra note 49, at 16 (citing Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 136,
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gress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 115l, which defines Indian country as
“(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . , (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States . . . , and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished . . . .”138
Two United States Supreme Court cases established the basis
of the dependent Indian community component of the 18 U.S.C. §
1151 definition of Indian country.  In the first case, United States v.
Sandoval,139 the Court created the “dependent Indian communi-
ties” test140 and held that the federal government has the power to
enact laws for the benefit and protection of all “dependent Indian
communities within the geographical limits of the United States.”141
In arriving at its decision, the Court stated that
[n]ot only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but long continued legisla-
tive and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial de-
cisions have attributed to the United States . . . the duty of exer-
cising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original terri-
tory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or
without the limits of a [s]tate.142
In United States v. McGowan,143 the second case on which
Congress relied when enacting section 1151(b), the Court used the
“dependent Indian community” test set forth in Sandoval to de-
termine whether an Indian “colony” was Indian country and sub-
ject to regulation by the federal government.144  In dismissing form
over substance, the court found that “the protection of a depend-
ent people” was the “fundamental consideration of both Congress
and the Department of the Interior” in establishing the colony and
that Native Americans in the colony had been “afforded the same
protection by the government” that had been provided to Native
Americans in other settlements known as “reservations.”145  The
Court held that a dependent Indian community is Indian country
and that Indian country exists wherever any land that has been
“‘set apart for the use of Indians as such under the superin-
                                                                                                                                
136).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
139. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
140. Id. at 47 (basing congressional guardianship over “dependent Indian
communities” on the existence of “Indian lineage, isolated and communal life,
primitive customs and limited civilization”).
141. Id. at 46.
142. Id. at 45-46.
143. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
144. Id. at 538-39.
145. Id. at 538.
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tendence of the [federal] [g]overnment.’”146
After the enactment of section 1151(b), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that a dependent Indian community is Indian country.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma,147 the Court held that “the test for determining
whether land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that
land is denominated ‘trust land’ or a ‘reservation.’  Rather, we ask
whether the area has been ‘validly set apart for the use of the Indi-
ans as such, under the superintendence of the [g]overnment.’”148
C. Legislative and Judicial Recognition of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty
The Supreme Court first recognized inherent tribal sover-
eignty in Worcester v. Georgia,149 holding that Indian nations were
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their origi-
nal natural rights . . . from time immemorial.”150  The doctrine of
inherent tribal sovereignty was later reaffirmed by the Court in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma,151 United States v. Wheeler,152 and Merrion v. Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe.153
Prior to the adoption of ANCSA — even prior to purchase of
Alaska by the United States — Native Alaskans had inherent
tribal sovereignty as well as Indian title to the territory they had
long possessed, used, and occupied as their ancestral land.  They
had the right to occupy their ancestral homelands until that right
was extinguished by Congress.154  Indian title is the right of occu-
pancy.155  The loss of Indian title — the right to use, occupy, or pos-
sess land — does not affect sovereignty of tribes.156
Tribal sovereignty is authorized under the IRA,157 in which
146. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)).
147. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
148. Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978)
(citations omitted)).
149. 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832).
150. Id. at 559.
151. 498 U.S. at 509 (noting that suits against Indian tribes are barred by sov-
ereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation).
152. 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (noting that powers of Indian tribes, including
the power to enforce criminal laws against tribe members, are inherent).
153. 455 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1982) (concluding that a tribe’s authority to tax non-
Indians who conduct business on the reservation is an inherent power necessary
to self-government).
154. See PEVAR, supra note 49, at 20-21.
155. See id. at 21.
156. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832).
157. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994).
FORD.CON 12/09/97  9:53 AM
464 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2
Congress provided that
[a]ny Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its common
welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws,
and any amendments thereto, which shall become effective when
(1) ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe
or tribes at a special election authorized and called by the Secre-
tary under such rules and regulations as the Secretary may pre-
scribe; and (2) approved by the Secretary pursuant to subsection
(d) of this section.158
This provision of the IRA was extended to Alaska in a 1936
amendment.159  The IRA also provides that “[i]n addition to all
powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law,
the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe
or its tribal council the . . . power[] [t]o . . . negotiate with the
[f]ederal, [s]tate and local governments.”160
In 1993, acting pursuant to the authority delegated to it by
Congress, the Department of the Interior published a list of Alaska
Native villages that were federally recognized as Indian tribes with
inherent sovereignty, that possessed the same status as tribes in the
lower forty-eight states, and that “functioned as political entities
exercising governmental authority.”161  The Department of the In-
terior emphasized that the purpose of the publication was to
“expressly and unequivocally acknowledge” that Alaska Native
villages and regional tribes included on the list were recognized as
political entities and retained their inherent sovereign authority.162
It stated that
[b]y the time of enactment of the IRA . . . the preponderant
opinion was that Alaska Natives were subject to the same legal
principles as Indians in the contiguous [forty-eight] states, and
had the same powers and attributes as other Indian tribes . . . .
The purpose of the current publication is to publish an Alaska
list of entities conforming to the intent of 25 CFR 83.6(b) and to
eliminate any doubt as to the Department’s intention by ex-
pressly and unequivocally acknowledging that the Department
has determined that the villages and regional tribes listed below
are distinctly Native communities and have the same status as
tribes in the contiguous [forty-eight] states.163
158. Id.
159. See id. § 473(a).
160. Id. § 476(e).
161. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,365 (1993).
162. Id. at 54,365
163. Id. at 54,365-66.
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IV. PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PENDING VENETIE
DECISION
A. Venetie: What the Supreme Court Should Find
When deciding Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II),164 the
United States Supreme Court should find that ANCSA did not ex-
tinguish Indian country and inherent tribal sovereignty for the Ve-
netie tribe, and should therefore uphold the Ninth Circuit opinion.
Furthermore, as Part III.B. discusses, the Venetie Village
qualifies as a dependent Indian community, and therefore as In-
dian country.  When it adopted ANCSA, Congress set apart land
for Native village corporations.  The land that was set apart for Na-
tive village corporations satisfies the requirement for “land set
apart for the use of Alaska Natives, as such.”165  In addition to be-
ing set apart, the land is under the superintendence of the federal
government.  This is demonstrated by the fact that Venetie re-
ceived federal grants and Congress included Alaska Natives in all
major legislation providing federal benefit and support programs
for Native Americans, as well as according them the same treat-
ment given to Native Americans living on reservations.166
A noted expert on Indian law in Alaska stated,
ANCSA did not end federal benefits and protections for Alaska
Natives; it concerned only their lands and land-related claims.
Natives in Alaska continue to be eligible for and receive assis-
tance under federal programs available to Indians throughout
the United States.  All major Indian legislation since ANCSA
specifically has included Alaska Natives or their villages or cor-
porations. Furthermore, Congress left intact about seventy In-
dian Reorganization Act tribal organizations and many other
tribal governments recognized by the United States as having
governmental powers and eligibility for tribal programs.  As long
as the indicia of dependence exist and Native people continue to
reside together in a reasonably distinct location recognized as
their residence by the federal government, they should be con-
sidered “dependent Indian communities.”  The authority of a
traditional or IRA government over an area does not depend on
ownership of land within the area by the tribal government itself.
Indeed, the statutory definition of Indian country was intended
to eliminate reliance on land titles in these matters.  Boundaries
created for other purposes, however, may be useful in showing
164. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
165. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
166. See generally Wilson v. Watt, 703 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1983); see also COHEN,
supra note 16, at 766.
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the minimum area to be considered the domain of a dependent
Indian community. These areas include lands that are patented
to Native corporations, owned by tribal governments, located
within former reservations, and located within Native villages
which are municipalities, so long as they remain part of Native
communities.167
As Part III.C. discusses, the Venetie tribe continues to possess
inherent tribal sovereignty.  The Neets’aii Gwich’in, in 1940,
adopted a constitution under the IRA.168  The constitution estab-
lished the Native Village of Venetie as their governing authority.169
In 1943, the Secretary of the Interior created a reservation out of
an area of 1.8 million acres of land surrounding the Village of Ve-
netie.170  In addition, Venetie appears among the Native entities on
the list published by the Department of the Interior.171
Overall, it is important to consider that when Congress en-
acted ANCSA, it most likely was aware of the doctrine of inherent
tribal sovereignty and the definition of Indian country.  However,
despite this knowledge, Congress did not explicitly state that
ANCSA extinguished Indian country or inherent tribal sover-
eignty.172
If Congress had intended ANCSA to extinguish Indian coun-
try in Alaska, it would have expressly done so.  In fact, the follow-
ing statement of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs in the 1987 ANCSA Amendments emphasizes that Congress
intended to limit ANCSA to settling the issue at hand — land
claims — and that ANCSA did not extinguish Indian country or
divest Alaska Native tribes of their inherent tribal sovereignty:
ANCSA was an Indian land claims settlement act. It was not, at
the time, the intent of Congress to deal in any way with the issue
of governmental authority of villages in Alaska. If village entities
had tribal governing powers under existing law prior to the pas-
sage of ANCSA, ANCSA did not effect them . . . . It is the intent
of the Committee that this is an issue which should be left to the
courts in interpreting applicable law.173
According to the United States Supreme Court, any Indian
right that is not expressly extinguished by a treaty or federal stat-
ute is reserved to Indian tribes.174  Under this reserved rights doc-
167. COHEN, supra note 16, at 766-67 (citations omitted).
168. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1289.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,369 (1993).
172. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(e) (1994).
173. H.R. REP. NO. 99-712, at 27 (1986).
174. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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trine, since ANCSA did not expressly extinguish Indian country,
Alaska Natives retained their inherent tribal rights and self gov-
ernment rights.175  In addition, all “statutes affecting Indian rights
‘are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved
in favor of the Indians.’”176  Since ANCSA falls into the category of
federal statutes enacted for the benefit of Native Americans, it,
too, must be liberally construed and interpreted so that any doubt
about whether it extinguished Indian country must be resolved in
favor of Native Alaskans.177  In short, the intent of Congress to ex-
tinguish Indian country must be reflected by language that is clear
and plain.178
Since Indian country and tribal sovereignty were not extin-
guished by ANCSA or any subsequent legislation, they continue to
exist.  The Native Village of Venetie, as well as any other tribe
with land that constitutes Indian country, continues to have the in-
herent tribal sovereignty they have had since long before the pur-
chase of Alaska from the Russians in 1867.
B. Venetie: What It Really Means
What exactly does recognition of Indian country and sover-
eignty in Alaska mean?  When the Venetie II decision was ren-
dered by the Ninth Circuit on November 20, 1996, Alaska Natives,
their supporters, and tribes in the contiguous states applauded the
ruling and the general recognition that Indian country, as well as
Native sovereignty and the inherent power it entails, could still ex-
ist in Alaska after ANCSA.179  However, representatives from the
State of Alaska, “[t]wenty [other] states, the Territory of Guam,
and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands” warned that the
“reach of the Venetie decision ‘[wa]s clear and ominous’” and
joined forces to have the ruling reversed by the United States Su-
preme Court.180  They also warned that the decision is so broad that
it could permit Indian country to be recognized anywhere there are
Indians.181  Those joining the suit against Venetie asserted that the
175. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
176. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov’t (Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alaska Pacific
Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
177. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
178. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941).
179. See Don Hunter, States Join Alaska in Stand Against Indian Country,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 22, 1997, at A1.
180. Id.
181. See Brief for Amici Curiae States at 30, Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch.
Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997) (No. 96-1577).
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decision could “enlarge the scope of tribal authority in other states
and threaten their ability to enforce civil and criminal laws, hunt-
ing, and fishing regulations and environmental rules.”182
Venetie and its supporters responded that the warnings and
“predictions of legal and cultural chaos” expressed by the State of
Alaska and “echoed by the other states” are “‘misleading, errone-
ous and exaggerated.’”183  The tribe and its supporters appear to be
correct.  Contrary to the argument of the State of Alaska and the
states that have joined with it in the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the Venetie decision is very narrow.  It does not
hold, or even imply, that Indian country exists in all Alaska Native
villages.  It does not hold that all ANCSA village corporation lands
are Indian country and subject to tribal jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit established a six-prong test that must be
satisfied in order for a particular community to constitute Indian
country.184  The court’s decision emphasized that all six elements of
that Indian country test must be satisfied by any Native community
in Alaska that is seeking to establish that it occupies Indian coun-
try185 and that only the sixth prong of the test was satisfied by dem-
onstrating that the land in question is ANCSA village land.186
Nothing in the court’s analysis or narrow ruling seems to support
arguments about the clear and ominous impact of the Venetie deci-
sion - and assertions of legal and cultural chaos resulting from the
decision appear to be exaggerated.
V. CONCLUSION
In a statement to Native Americans and non-Natives gathered
to discuss the scope of Indian country and inherent Native sover-
eignty, Patrice H. Kunesh, an attorney for the Mashantucket Pe-
quot Tribal Nation stated that
The reverence American Indians hold for the sovereignty of
their tribal governments is tremendous.  Certainly this respect
equals that possessed by all Americans for the freedoms
[e]mbraced in the [United States] Constitution . . . .
182. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 6, id.
183. Hunter, supra note 178, at A1.
184. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1292.
185. See id. at 1300-02.
186. See id. at 1301-02.  Native village corporation lands and regional corpora-
tion lands were set aside for the benefit of Native villages under ANCSA; how-
ever, a close reading of the Venetie II decision demonstrates that it only discusses
the status of Native village lands.  It is questionable whether the six-prong test
established by the court of appeals is also applicable to regional corporation lands
that are contiguous to and form a part of a Native village community in Alaska to
determine if the regional lands also qualify as Indian country.
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Sovereignty is a powerful word that conveys in its interpreta-
tion the baggage of centuries of human emotion.  Originally re-
ferring to the absolute power of kings over their subjects — the
king could do no wrong . . . .
Much of the understanding regarding tribal sovereignty stems
from the mistaken idea that it is a gift granted by the federal
government to American Indian tribes.
The reality is that American Indian tribes and tribal govern-
ments existed long before . . . the framers of the [United States]
Constitution were born.
American Indian sovereignty encompasses inherent rights and
powers that have been retained by Native nations and not spe-
cifically abridged by the federal government.187
As evidenced by the Venetie II case, Native American tribes
have begun to reassert inherent sovereignty in recent years.  As
sovereign nations, tribes such as the Venetie tribe chose to “simply
exercis[e] their . . . rights” and “make money from their right to tax
business ventures” on their lands as well as pursuing entrepreneu-
rial activities.188  The funds raised from taxes or entrepreneurial ac-
tivities have allowed tribes to make “striking advances on numer-
ous reservations” and support fire stations, health clinics,
education, housing, employment, and other programs that have
“dramatically improved the lives” of Native Americans.189
According to many Native Americans, the “efforts of Ameri-
can Indians to improve their standard of living for themselves and
their children requires the freedom to employ their innate sover-
eignty,” which is “not a weapon but an inherent characteristic and
vehicle that can transport” Native Americans from “dependency
to self-sufficiency.”190
On December 10, 1997, the United States Supreme Court will
hear arguments concerning whether or not Indian country and in-
herent tribal sovereignty survived ANCSA and continue to exist in
Alaska and, if so, whether Venetie inhabits Indian country.  The
outcome of this decision is of utmost importance to the Venetie
tribe and other Native American tribes that cherish their inherent
Native sovereignty.  As stated by Ms. Kunesh, not only does sover-
eignty symbolize freedom, it also enhances important revenue
sources that “many tribes have used to raise themselves out of
poverty.”191  The successful end of the battle for sovereignty —
freedom and revenue enhancement — for at least one tribe of Na-
187. Patrice H. Kunesh, Sovereignty is Absolute for Native Nations, Address
at the Quinnipiac College School of Law, Oct. 24, 1997.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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tive Americans, the Venetie, now lies in the hands of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
